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# PHOTOGRAPHY /// The Continuous Coincidence of the Crime and the Photograph

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In 1966, Michelangelo Antonioni released his first English-language film, Blow Up, in which he introduces a photographer played by David Hemmings, who realizes in his dark room that he may have captured the evidence of a crime on one of his photographs. Intrigued by a detail in the background of the picture he took, he undertakes to ‘blow up’ this detail (something proper to film photography) to a point where he is able to confirm his suspicion. Similarly, a few days ago, I realized that the most updated Google Earth data for Gaza consisted in photographs taken on July 29, 2014, the day when the Israeli army bombed the single power plant of the Strip (see this July 2014 map to understand the electric power supply in Gaza). The photographs show a large cloud of smoke spread over the land of Gaza as an evidence of the dreadful action of the Israeli army against the 1.8 millions inhabitants of the Strip, since those of them who were not directly suffering from the destruction of their homes had nonetheless to face shortage of electricity, clean water and sewage because of the power plant bombing (see past article). Google uses a mix of satellite and aircraft photography in order to compose their representation of the Earth and, just like in Antonioni’s movie, we could think of a coincidence for the satellite to be present a few moments after the bombing, and it has been suggested to me that Google deliberately kept this imagery as a form of geopolitical positioning. However, the last murderous siege on Gaza (July-August 2014) cannot be compared with the crime depicted in Blow Up: there is no coincidence or, rather, the coincidence is continuous.

The cloud of smoke we see on the photograph above is particularly spectacular as it comes from a large electrical infrastructure and, if we follow Eyal Weizman in his descriptions of these clouds/mushrooms over Gaza, we can even say that, to some degree, the cloud is the power plant itself, manifested in another form. Nevertheless, the Israeli army’s 2,695 bombings during the 50 days (an average of a bombing every twenty-six minutes) of the so-called “Operation Protective Edge,” as indexed by Amnesty International in association with Forensic Architecture (directed by Weizman), produced as many clouds of smoke. The latest fascinating research undertaken by Forensic Architecture (soon to be released) precisely investigates these clouds/mushrooms as temporal and spatial keys in order to reconstitute the specific enactment of the so-called “Hannibal Directive” on August 1, 2014, when the Israeli army is suspected to have taken every possible action to kill one of its own soldiers who had been captured. The various photographs (satellite and on ground) and films collected from this specific days allow Forensic Architecture to temporally and spatially coordinate what they show in order to reconstitute the course of events (more on that when the research will actually be released publicly).

Gaza Wall Contrast

We should however not forget that the crime of the Israeli government and its army against Gaza is not temporally circumscribed to its regular bombings and its three operations in 2008-09, 2012 and 2014. As written in the past (see “The Continuous Siege“), the latter are ‘only’ the manifestation of an extreme and spectacular violence that tends to obliterate for the external viewer, the normal forms of violence that the territorial organization of Gaza continuously manufactures. In other words, the dark cloud of smoke that Google Earth show us hides (almost literally) the 70 kilometers of wall that incarcerate the Gaza Strip. Any aerial photograph of the Gaza Strip of these last 15 years will clearly show the scar of Apartheid, separating the Israeli well-irrigated agriculture from Gaza’s dry land to a point that the Strip’s limits can be recognized at any scale even by a non-alerted viewer (see photograph below). As Weizman argues in his latest book, The Conflict Shoreline (Steidl 2015), written in association with Fazal Sheikh‘s photographs of the Negev (more on that soon), the surface of the earth itself can be considered as a photographic surface from which evidences can be collected. This work also takes part of a current exhibition about the forensic potential of photography at Le Bal (Paris) under the name “Images of Conviction: The Construction of Visual Evidence” curated by Diane Dufour.

Gaza Strip Google Earth The Gaza Strip is clearly recognizable by the strong ground impact of its enforced boundary.

Although photographs’ degree of incrimination varies depending on what they actually show, it would therefore be a mistake to assume that some images constitute evidence when some others do not in the case of geopolitical criminality. Only specific and precise readings of these documents can make them talk like prosopopeia (i.e. the speech of things, see past article). Sometimes, this implies looking at a particular aspect of representation that do not seem immediately related to the crime itself. This is how Weizman recounts how Forensic Architecture worked in collaboration with a researcher on Global Warming who uses satellite data showing where photosynthesis operates and where it does not. In doing so, they were able to map the paths of Israeli tanks outside and inside the Gaza Strip as the various plants on which they drove irremediably died under such weight. Although an aerial photograph would not reveal these paths, specific data detecting CO2 does.

Forensic, by definition, intervenes after the crime was committed and, thus, do not prevent it to occur and political forces should be as much applied to the prosecution of its perpetrators as to the prevention of its repetition or, in the case of the continuous crime at stake here, of its cessation. However, impunity certainly provides the conditions of such repetition, and the investigative work we might exercise in the Blow Up operation of exhuming the evidence from the photograph (or whatever else document for that matter) is therefore crucial in the fragilization of this same impunity it might trigger.


EVICTED SWIMMING POOLS IN TEXAS & PALESTINE: MAPPING TERRITORIALIZED RACISM

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Al-Karmil (Leopold Lambert for The Funambulist)
Maps created by Léopold Lambert for The Funambulist (June 2015) / Access a high-quality version here (12MB) (license: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommerical-ShareAlike 4.0)

Two recent events involving the policed/militarized evacuation of a swimming pool based on the ethnicity of the swimmers have recently came to light. 1. McKinney, U.S. /// On June 6, 2015, in McKinney, a suburban town of Texas, a group of African American children who were celebrating the end of the scholar year by organizing a pool party in the local swimming pool were evicted from it by the police. Some of them were arrested and insulted, and one Black teenager girl was violently assaulted by a White police officer before being crushed onto the ground by the same officer for long minutes. We can suspect that we would have never heard of this sickening event if it was not for a clear video showing the totality of the assault — in this regard, it is crucial to see that the cut images massively shown in the press reflects less the violence of the assault than do the long minutes of the video during which the young woman, sobbing, had her face in the ground, the police officer pressing his weight on her back. I am adding here a small map of what I believe is the spatial context in which this racist assault occurred (I found it through a few information found in articles, as well as from the visual indications of the video itself), since the aim of this article is to understand these two events through the spatial politics at work in both situations — a situation that I do not know specifically in the policed neighborhood of Craig Ranch in McKinney, Texas, but that evidently do not escape from the structural racism the characterize the relationships between the American forces of police and Black bodies.

McKinney Texas Aerial photo of North Craig Ranch, McKinney, Texas

2. Al-Karmil, Palestine /// The second event that share similarities with the first one despite the geographical distance and differences of which we should remain aware each time we establish parallels between the African American struggle and the Palestinian one, occurred in the West Bank village of Al-Karmil (see maps above) on April 7, 2015. As the Israeli organization B’Tselem recounts,

during Passover holidays, a group of hundreds of settlers accompanied by Israeli security forces came to Birkat al-Karmil – a natural pool close to the village of al-Karmil, which lies in the southern Hebron Hills within Area A. […] B’Tselem’s investigation found that at about 2:00 P.M., hundreds of settlers arrived at the pool accompanied by dozens of soldiers, Border Police, and representatives of the Civil Administration (CA). The security forces ordered the Palestinian bathers to leave the pool and remain on the edge of the park. They allowed the settlers, however, free and exclusive use of the rest of the park. At about 5:30 P.M., the settlers and the security forces left the area. According to media reports, reveal that the settlers came to the pool on the initiative of the Susiya Tour and Study Center. In its publications, the center described the pool as the historical site of the Biblical settlement of Carmel and emphasized that the visit was authorized and accompanied by the military. (source)

The spatial politics at work in the case of Al-Karmil are sensibly different from the ones in McKinney, because of the legal essentialization implemented between Palestinians and Israelis/tourists. The maps presented above and below thus intend to illustrate how this essentialization is (il)legally organized in this context of the Southern part of the West Bank (South-East of Hebron). As explained occasionally on this platform, Areas A (full civil and security control by the Palestinian Authority), B (Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control), and C (full Israeli civil and security control) correspond to a fragmentation of the West Bank per the secretly signed Oslo Accords in 1993. 63% of the West Bank is included in Area C, which thus form a milieu surrounding the islands of the “Palestinian Archipelago” (see past article/maps). This agreement, beyond its obvious legitimization of the Israeli occupation, only applies to security control. Despite the fact that they serve to determine the Oslo territorial fragmentation, the Israeli civil settlements that host about 500,000 inhabitants (East Jerusalem not included), remain fundamentally a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The two settlements involved in the direct neighborhood of Al-Karmil are Carmel and Ma’on (see below), which, despite a relatively small population, constitute for the Israeli government what it considers as a buffer protection between the Palestinian ‘islands’ and the South part of the 1949 Green line that determines the West Bank territoriality (which used to be under Jordanian control between 1949 and 1967). Such a strategy is made explicit by Ariel Sharon in his Memoirs, where he recounts his advocacy for the construction of more Israeli settlements in the Sinai in the late 1970s (when he was Minister of Agriculture), in order to constitute a line of defense in occupied territory. The essentialization manufactured between Palestinians and Israelis also appears in the urban design and architecture of the old Palestinian villages and the suburban looking Israeli settlements. This does not simply indicate two different ways of life and social conditions, it also has military purposes, as Eyal Weizman explains in his (excellent) interview with Al Jazeera: the orange roofs of the settlements are clearly recognizable in contrast to the Palestinian homes, in order for the Israeli army aviation to recognize them as such.

Maps carmel and ma'on settlements (The Funambulist)
Settlements of Carmel and Ma’on (The Funambulist 2015) / Source for population data

3. Why Swimming Pools Are Not Innocent Spaces ///

What these two events fundamentally share is their centrality on two swimming pools, and, although, we could consider this specific place as any other sites of leisure, it is my conviction that we should not. First of all, the swimming pool is the space of the (quasi) naked body. Naked bodies involve in no-way a form of corporeal truth (a rationale as cliché: “the body liberated from its artifices”…), but they certainly render them fragile in the absence of sartorial defense. The testimonies of Palestinian men swimming in the Al-Karmil swimming pool and forcefully evicted by the Israeli soldiers reflect this absolute contrast of the military gears/weapons and their own nudity. In McKinney, what adds to our horror is the nudity of the teenage girl being assaulted by the police officer, which thus engages the imaginary of sexual aggression.

Swimming pools form an aquatic milieu. In his testimony, Ibrahim Abu Tabikh, a Palestinian teenage boy who was swimming in the Al-Karmil pool recounts: “The settlers complained about our being in the pool and three young settlers started swimming towards us” (source). Although B’Tselem did not make the inventory of any physical violence causing injuries during the invasion of the swimming pool and that intent of such a violence from the Israeli settlers cannot be presumed, it ought to be reminded that water is fundamentally a dangerous milieu for human bodies and that someone can be drown and killed in it in the time lapse of a few seconds.

The last thing that characterizes the aquatic milieu of the swimming pool has more to do with a more or less conscious psychological reaction to this milieu. Water, in its appreciable materiality (in opposition to air), expresses the fact that the bodies situated within it, share a milieu. It thus invokes an imaginary based on the transfer or not of material elements between bodies, in particular, dirt. In other words, water makes it less tolerable for bodies to share a milieu with bodies considered as dirty or abject. Abjection does not however merely stop at the actual aspect of a body ‘ornamented’ with conventional dirty elements, it is also defined by what anthropologist Mary Douglas calls “matter out of place” (Purity and Danger, 1966). The abjection that characterizes racism is thus ‘hypertrophied’ when placed in the aquatic context of the swimming pool, hence the necessity felt by bodies presuming of this abjection to evict bodies considered as abject from this milieu, and thus the two events described in this article. Muhammad Mahaniyah, a young Palestinian man who was swimming in the Al-Karmil swimming pool before being forcefully evicted by the Israeli soldiers offers us the following conclusion: “I had no problem with the settlers swimming along with me” (source). Just like racism, abjection is not symmetrical; both manifest the manufactured relationships of power involved between essentialized bodies. These two events, which have been made broadly public on the contrary of many others, illustrate this violence.

Acknowledgement: A big thank you to Constant Harbonn for his help to access some territorial data on which this article relies.

“The Political”: Interview with C-o-l-o-n

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“The Political” Interview for C-O-L-O-N (Columbia University GSAPP) Volume III alongside Bernard Tschumi, Peggy Deamer & Paul Segal, Eyal Weizman, Ai Weiwei, Mary Mc Leod & Rheinhold Martin, and Cristina Goberna. See website for the other conversations.

C-O-L-O-N: I’d like to talk to your emphasis on the word “corporeal” in your upcoming book Topie Impitoyable: The Corporeal Politics of the Cloth, the Wall, and the Street. In that book you describe the human body firstly as a material assemblage. Why do you see the need to emphasize this materiality?

Léopold Lambert: I always find it useful to go back to the most elementary way of looking at architecture and our bodies. In the case of bodies and architecture as material assemblages, it is necessary that they are situated somewhere, occupying a space. A wall may occupy a space for 300 years while my body might occupy the space on this chair for maybe one hour. The essential difference we make out of it comes from an anthropocentric way of looking at things and, similarly, we may not look at the space the wall occupies and the space my body occupies as similar. But if I stand up from my chair and try to occupy the space of the wall in front of me, there is going to be a fight between the material assemblage of my body and the wall. I am going to have to use force, but the wall will withstand my body.  There is a violence in this encounter; in other words, both material assemblages are affected by it, although not equally. Violence always varies in degrees, never in essence. The violence I just mentioned is pre-political. Not chronologically, of course, but methodologically, we can see that there is a violence inherent to architecture, which is then necessarily instrumentalized politically: the way we normally build walls is to resist the energy of the body. We then invented devices like doors—a regulator of the wall porosity—and keys, which allows us to establish who can get past architecture’s violence and who cannot. Now, who gets access to the instrument that can transform a regular house into a prison cell is political, but it is not architecturalper se to say who gets the key.

C-O-L-O-N: Perhaps not, but architecture is setting up the scenario where one person has a key and the other does not.

Léopold Lambert: For me, architecture is the discipline that organizes bodies in space: we organize the occupation of matter. The title of my upcoming book comes from a sentence by Foucault, “mon corps topie impitoyable” (2) (I can only badly translate it into “there is no escape from my body”). The body occupies a place that is at the exception of every other place, and only this particular material assemblage can occupy this space at a particular moment. There is a vertigo in realizing that it is simultaneously a necessary decision (my body cannot be nowhere) and also a radical one (my body can only be here, and only my body can be here). By being confronted with this decision we can start to distinguish the notion of political intensity: obviously it’s not the same thing to be sitting in my living room, or in the streets in a demonstration, or in a civil war…

C-O-L-O-N: You have suggested that the limit of one’s body extends to include their environment. Could you talk about this relationship?

Léopold Lambert: By default, we tend to think that the body stops at the skin, but then how am I able to feel it when someone stands two inches behind me? If I need air to breathe, at what moment is the air part of my body and what moment is it not? If someone wraps me in plastic wrap all of a sudden my living function will get greatly affected. Something we should continue to bring up is the notion of atmosphere. There are two thinkers who influence my thoughts on atmosphere: Peter Sloterdijk and Frantz Fanon: Sloterdijk for his concept of atmoterror, and Fanon about the daily breathing of colonized bodies. In Fanon’s book, A Dying Colonialism, he describes how it is not merely a territory that is colonized, but the very breathing of the colonized population is occupied. Decolonization thus consists in a “combat breathing.” In this sentence we go back to the notion of direct control over the immediate environment that echoes Eric Garner’s final words, “I can’t breathe,” when he was strangled by a white police officer, and which has become a slogan of the Black Lives Matter political movement.

C-O-L-O-N: The CIA handbook on “enhanced interrogation techniques” legally operates precisely in this ambiguous zone of the extension of the body. The handbook outlines the many ways to manipulate the immediate environment in such extreme ways that affects are directly felt on the body. Solitary confinement is only one example, but they extend also to confining a body in a box so small that one cannot extend their limbs, and of course water boarding. In each case the “sanctity” of the envelope of the body is preserved, it is the environment that is manipulated.

Léopold Lambert: What really struck me when I saw these methods was to see how architectural they were, both in their design and their effectuation. Their precision and the anticipation of the bodies behaviors and organization in space allows us to say that, this too is architecture.

C-O-L-O-N: In a statement by Foucault that you’ve refuted, he claims “after all, the architect has no power over me. If I want to tear down or change a house he built for me, put up new partitions, add a chimney, the architect has no control.”(1) This is a common argument against the oppression of architecture.

Léopold Lambert: I honestly do not think that this is Foucault at his best, and I wish that architects would not draw too much attention to it. This remark puts us in the legal position of a homeowner, something foreign to a majority of us. We can agree that there is no emancipatory architecture, that emancipation is necessarily a practice. But we go too quickly to the corollary of this sentence, that there is no oppressive architecture, only practices. The point I am trying to make is what if architecture in its very inherence is an instrument to what we tend to call oppression.

I am regularly asked about this Rousseauian argument of architecture—you know, the mountain shelter, something that protects us from the elements. “Is this really violent?” My answer is “yes very much so!” Of course we are always talking about degrees of violence but this shelter provides protection to the bodies that have access to it, and there is a protocol to determine who gets access, even if it is as simple as “first here first serve.” Imagine it is snowing and people start coming to seek protection, they keep coming: there will be a moment when bodies will no longer be granted access to this protection. Once the shelter exists, there is now the inside, but what is outside is no longer an untouched natural milieu. Each wall creates social conditions on both of its sides: the included and the excluded. One can only be homeless (‘prisoner of the outside’) if there is something called home.

C-O-L-O-N: The location of an object is very important to its political intensity. In a previous episode we raised this question with Bernard Tschumi and spoke about how a rock and a gun interact with their environment. (3) We can imagine the political potential of almost every object by relocating or reframing it. Likewise, we can always trace a lineage of decisions, which by nature are political, that led to the creation of an object—but that is not to say that everything is political. I argue that in order for an object to be political it needs to have a confrontation with a human actor that has an alternative intention. For example, I would say that the wall is not political unless it is in conflict with my desire to transverse it. I worry that when we say everything is political the word loses its meaning and dissuades architects from engaging with it.

Léopold Lambert: I am not interested in the word intention or agenda. Somehow intention makes things easier to understand because we can relate to the rational regime of the intention. But intention is only such a small aspect of the way things unfold themselves politically. So that gets us to the thing about the word “political” losing its meaning. It relates to the fact that we always tend to think of the world in essences (“this thing is a body, this thing is a table, etc.”) and thus wonder if everything is political. Rather, we should be thinking in terms of degrees or intensity. Saying everything is political does not mean that things are equally political; it also means that everything varies in political intensity depending on their location: a soldier, or an army vehicle, do not develop the same political intensity when they are in their own country, as when they are deployed at war.

All bodies, whether animate or inanimate necessarily occupy a space and the political intensity varies depending on the space. It goes back to the first question, that only one material assemblage can occupy a space at one time. The example of the army vehicle is an obvious one, but we can just as well think of gentrification as a demonstrative instance of this, where occupation becomes a way of life that occupies space. We must not think in essences, that the army vehicle or gentrifier has a political essence, rather that they produce political situations.

C-O-L-O-N: You claim that all architecture is violent, but are there situations in which this violence can be viewed as beneficial? For example the wall that divides the men’s bathroom from the women’s bathroom. Undeniably the architecture violently separates the genders, but in the populist mind of society it seems this separation could be considered a “welcomed violence?”

Léopold Lambert: The question is who welcome this violence? The violence bodies have to experience is proportional to their degree of separation from the norm. In these conditions, obviously cisgender bodies, by definition, welcome the violence of their categorization into two definitive types, but what about other bodies, who do not recognize such an essential categorization? The restrooms are particular because of the enunciation of the norm—often represented by two stereotypical drawings on the doors—but the violence of the norm operates in all designed space, precisely because space is designed through a normative vision of the body.

C-O-L-O-N: The architect is always working within a subjectively constructed view of the world. The logics of the dominance of architecture over the human body can be used for “good” or “bad,” but that distinction is an essentially moralizing argument. Perhaps the most important thing to emphasize is that architecture actively replicates the architect’s vision of the body on the bodies that move through it. How does shifting our world-view affect our architecture?

Léopold Lambert: Temple Grandin, a professor of animal sciences at Colorado State University, explains that her autism allows her to be more sensitive to the stress of the cattle in slaughterhouses. She understood which aspects of the design in the procession was increasing the cattle’s level of stress, and thus designed some elaborated corridors to lead the cattle to its death in such a way that the cattle will not realize what is about to happen to it. To bring the cows to their death in a non-stressful way seems to be an ethical practice and she is using architecture for it. But at the end of the day, if we need to discuss if it’s a good thing for animal rights, we might want to wonder if the animal does not deserve the right to fight an ultimate fight, even if it’s a desperate hopeless fight against this death; architecture prevents this right to be fulfilled.

It’s particularly delicate to draw from this industry of death example to compare animal bodies to human bodies, without making a strict comparison, but continuing to talk about the violence of architecture we can draw a lot of connections from horrific historical occurrences to architecture. Without architecture these political ambitions that sometimes reached an incredible degree of violence could not have happened. We can think of the slave ship and the absolute horror experienced by hundreds of bodies packed in the ship hold—without the slave ship, the slave trade could simply not exist as we know it. We can think of so many examples if we think about design in its totality—I mean, every weapon is a designed object. But again, the risk is to insist only on obvious occurrences of violence when the same logic also operates in more mundane conditions.

I understand that once this is all said, we can ask: “Everything we do will be violent—so why don’t we quit, what can we do if we know that innocence is not a possibility.” Well it may be paradoxical, but if there is no innocence, that might be something of a liberation in thinking about our practice as designers. Sometimes it’s the designers who want to be the least involved, the least interventionist, that end up being extremely problematic in so far that the “least active contribution” to this political process of creation means the more the output of this creation will be contributing to the dominant relationship of power in a given society. Architecture will carry a certain violence on bodies, and when we realize that we can start wondering which bodies. If you’re not wondering which bodies then the violence will be always applied to promote the normative bodies’ society. What I am saying becomes extremely obvious when the bodies experiencing the space are in a wheelchair, or are blind, all of these names we invented to talk about non-normative bodies. The point I would like to make is that it is the same for every body. Some bodies are awfully close to the norm in the way they appear to others but every body has a certain degree of non-normativity. When you design architecture you can start to orient these political and problematic aspects of what you create with your own political agenda. We could say that architecture is a weapon, and once we have realized this, we are offered the possibility to use this weapon for what is important to us. And that’s not to say that it will necessarily serve this agenda, there is a strong difference between what you intend to do and what is the effect of your intent—once the effects exist your intent becomes irrelevant.

C-O-L-O-N: I think this statement, “the impossibility of innocence” is very empowering as an architect. You also say the renunciation of power is an illusion.

Léopold Lambert: It is an illusion, insofar that it is a full on embrace of the status quo.

NOTES ///

1) Foucault Michel, Space, Power, and Knowledge. An interview with Paul Rabinow, Skyline, March 1982, trans. Christian Hubert

2) Foucault Michel, The Utopian Body. France-Culture. Radio lecture. 1966.

3) Tschumi Bernard, “Around the mountain or through the mountain.” : The Political, Episode I. 2015.

Thank you Cecil Barnes for this invitation

Thinking about the Green Line in Palestine: Its Thickness and its Obsolescence

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A few days ago, Orit Theuer, a recent graduate from the Vienna Academy of Fine Arts, shared with me her thesis project (2014) investigating the 1949 Armistice Line between Israel and the Palestinian territories on the West Bank of the Jordan River, which was under Jordanian control until the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967. This line is more known as the “Green Line” and Theuer’s work allows us to explore its path and debate of its hypothetical obsolescence.

Many people who produce knowledge around the territorial struggles at work in historic Palestine, experience a fascination for cartographying their spatial components. Nevertheless, maps and aerial photographs can potentially disincarnate the issues at stake if they’re not complemented by other documents ‘on the ground’ bringing the viewers to the earthly realms of bodies and materiality. Theuer thus undertook to drive as close as possible of the totality of the Green Line path from its North intersection with the Jordan River, to its Southern one with the Dead Sea (see map below) and associated photographs she took to each aerial view of the Green Line. Her main site of investigation is less the territories on both sides of the line than what I like to call, “the oxymoronic thickness of the line” (see the 2010 graphic novel Lost in the Line as one instance of it) and the ambiguous legality applied in it. A similar approach in Palestine has been undertaken by Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency directed by Sandi Hilal, Alessandro Petti, and Eyal Weizman in their research “The Lawless Line” (2010) about the West Bank areas’ lines as defined by the 1993 Oslo Accords. As Theuers reminds us in the beginning of her Atlas of No-Man’s Landthe Green Line was originally defined by both the Israeli and Transjordanian commanders of Jerusalem in 1948, respectively Moshe Dayan and Abdullah el-Tell. Drawn in precarious conditions considering the future impact of its path — the story goes that it was either on the ground or on a military jeep’s bonnet — the line could not acquire the mathematical ‘purity’ that its definition entitles (a line has no thickness) since it was drawn by “three to four millimeters wide” grease pencils. Based on the scale of the map on which it was drawn (1:250,000), the thickness of the line is no less than 80 meters, a substantial space of legal ambiguity. Moreover, this thickness increases with a significant degree in the region of Jerusalem where the line occasionally splits (another oxymoron) into two between Dayan and el-Tell’s paths (in red on Theuer’s maps). As Theuer recounts, the zone between the two lines has a real juridical precedence in the ambiguity it constitutes as the 2003 trial “Eitan Kramer vs. The State of Israel” attests. The 168 pages of the Atlas of No-Man’s Land reconstituting the totality of the Green Line’s path show us the paradoxical ‘full-ness’ of the line’s thickness: towns, fields, roads occupy its liminal space despite the lack of legal definition proper to it.

Similarly to maps disincarnating situations, asymmetric agreements can be misleading if we think of them as applied realities. We therefore have to use Theuer’s work in a critical manner to wonder if the Green Line stills correspond to any reality ‘on the ground,’ and whether it is still a relevant line to consider in the Palestinian struggle for existence in historical Palestine. Since 1967, the Green Line is supposed to characterize the separation of Israel’s sovereign territory and the territory of its army’s occupation. The construction of about 150 settlements in the occupied territories, where more than 600,000 Israeli civilians currently live (the settlements in the Gaza Strip were evacuated and demolished in 2005) rendered the reality sensibly more complex — I am not talking of the problem from a legal point of view here — as did the erection of 500 kilometers of the so-called “separation barrier” that attempts to run as east as possible in the West Bank to connect the largest amount of settlements to the Israeli territory. Settlements’ inhabitants, whose presence in occupied territory violates the Fourth Geneva Convention, do not abide by the Israeli military legislation and judiciary system as Palestinians do, and the multiplication of such different legal and administrative treatment on a same territory, depending the ethnicity of the considered bodies, fully corresponds to a situation of Apartheid.

Through a forty-year-old politics of colonization of the West Bank as well as the last fifteen years intensification of Apartheid spatial apparatuses, Israel has rendered the Green Line obsolete. Although, we can and should be outraged by the overwhelming power deployed on the Palestinian lives by the Israeli government and army, we would be seriously mistaken to wish for a return to the 1949-1967 situation, as the recent prospects for a Palestinian State pretend to incarnate (see past article). It is in the interest of the Israeli government to pretend as long as possible that it is not interested in the two-states so-called “solution” (see past article about this notion) as Benjamin Netanyahu has affirmed two days before the last elections before retracting himself shortly after he won the latter. Such a scenario is nevertheless in its long-term advantage. Every move by Israel to withdraw back to the Green Line will be perceived as a substantial effort to head towards an illusory peace, when they would merely correspond to the conformity to the International legislation, unrelated to the past sixty-seven years of oppression. The Green Line thus materializes an horizon for the opportunistic Palestinian Authority to reach as a sign of victory, when the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1949 borders. Such a scenario would legally legitimatize the ethnic cleansing that created the State of Israel on a land to which about 5 millions of Palestinian refugees await to go back in the overpopulated camps of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Gaza and the West Bank. The prospect of a common state for all “from the Jordan River to the Sea” as the adage goes, on the other hand, only requires consideration for the Green Line in the judgment of the Apartheid politics of the State of Israel until the creation of such a common state (whether it is done in the context of a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” like in the 1990s South Africa or in more classic or imaginative forms of trials). It is thus important to stop considering the Green Line as the fetish of a regretted past used in useless and asymmetrical negotiations and, instead, to use it as a strict legal instrument deprived of a future.

Excerpts of Atlas of No-Man’s Land by Orit Theuer (2013) ///

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The Continuous Coincidence of the Crime and the Photograph

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In 1966, Michelangelo Antonioni released his first English-language film, Blow Up, in which he introduces a photographer played by David Hemmings, who realizes in his dark room that he may have captured the evidence of a crime on one of his photographs. Intrigued by a detail in the background of the picture he took, he undertakes to ‘blow up’ this detail (something proper to film photography) to a point where he is able to confirm his suspicion. Similarly, a few days ago, I realized that the most updated Google Earth data for Gaza consisted in photographs taken on July 29, 2014, the day when the Israeli army bombed the single power plant of the Strip (see this July 2014 map to understand the electric power supply in Gaza). The photographs show a large cloud of smoke spread over the land of Gaza as an evidence of the dreadful action of the Israeli army against the 1.8 millions inhabitants of the Strip, since those of them who were not directly suffering from the destruction of their homes had nonetheless to face shortage of electricity, clean water and sewage because of the power plant bombing (see past article). Google uses a mix of satellite and aircraft photography in order to compose their representation of the Earth and, just like in Antonioni’s movie, we could think of a coincidence for the satellite to be present a few moments after the bombing, and it has been suggested to me that Google deliberately kept this imagery as a form of geopolitical positioning. However, the last murderous siege on Gaza (July-August 2014) cannot be compared with the crime depicted in Blow Up: there is no coincidence or, rather, the coincidence is continuous.

The cloud of smoke we see on the photograph above is particularly spectacular as it comes from a large electrical infrastructure and, if we follow Eyal Weizman in his descriptions of these clouds/mushrooms over Gaza, we can even say that, to some degree, the cloud is the power plant itself, manifested in another form. Nevertheless, the Israeli army’s 2,695 bombings during the 50 days (an average of a bombing every twenty-six minutes) of the so-called “Operation Protective Edge,” as indexed by Amnesty International in association with Forensic Architecture (directed by Weizman), produced as many clouds of smoke. The latest fascinating research undertaken by Forensic Architecture (soon to be released) precisely investigates these clouds/mushrooms as temporal and spatial keys in order to reconstitute the specific enactment of the so-called “Hannibal Directive” on August 1, 2014, when the Israeli army is suspected to have taken every possible action to kill one of its own soldiers who had been captured. The various photographs (satellite and on ground) and films collected from this specific days allow Forensic Architecture to temporally and spatially coordinate what they show in order to reconstitute the course of events (more on that when the research will actually be released publicly).

Gaza Wall Contrast

We should however not forget that the crime of the Israeli government and its army against Gaza is not temporally circumscribed to its regular bombings and its three operations in 2008-09, 2012 and 2014. As written in the past (see “The Continuous Siege“), the latter are ‘only’ the manifestation of an extreme and spectacular violence that tends to obliterate for the external viewer, the normal forms of violence that the territorial organization of Gaza continuously manufactures. In other words, the dark cloud of smoke that Google Earth show us hides (almost literally) the 70 kilometers of wall that incarcerate the Gaza Strip. Any aerial photograph of the Gaza Strip of these last 15 years will clearly show the scar of Apartheid, separating the Israeli well-irrigated agriculture from Gaza’s dry land to a point that the Strip’s limits can be recognized at any scale even by a non-alerted viewer (see photograph below). As Weizman argues in his latest book, The Conflict Shoreline (Steidl 2015), written in association with Fazal Sheikh‘s photographs of the Negev (more on that soon), the surface of the earth itself can be considered as a photographic surface from which evidences can be collected. This work also takes part of a current exhibition about the forensic potential of photography at Le Bal (Paris) under the name “Images of Conviction: The Construction of Visual Evidence” curated by Diane Dufour.

Gaza Strip Google Earth The Gaza Strip is clearly recognizable by the strong ground impact of its enforced boundary.

Although photographs’ degree of incrimination varies depending on what they actually show, it would therefore be a mistake to assume that some images constitute evidence when some others do not in the case of geopolitical criminality. Only specific and precise readings of these documents can make them talk like prosopopeia (i.e. the speech of things, see past article). Sometimes, this implies looking at a particular aspect of representation that do not seem immediately related to the crime itself. This is how Weizman recounts how Forensic Architecture worked in collaboration with a researcher on Global Warming who uses satellite data showing where photosynthesis operates and where it does not. In doing so, they were able to map the paths of Israeli tanks outside and inside the Gaza Strip as the various plants on which they drove irremediably died under such weight. Although an aerial photograph would not reveal these paths, specific data detecting CO2 does.

Forensic, by definition, intervenes after the crime was committed and, thus, do not prevent it to occur and political forces should be as much applied to the prosecution of its perpetrators as to the prevention of its repetition or, in the case of the continuous crime at stake here, of its cessation. However, impunity certainly provides the conditions of such repetition, and the investigative work we might exercise in the Blow Up operation of exhuming the evidence from the photograph (or whatever else document for that matter) is therefore crucial in the fragilization of this same impunity it might trigger.

15-Minute Walking Distance from a Train Station: Spatial Inequality in Paris Banlieues

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Map created for the purpose of this article / Download it here in high resolution (4.5 MB)
(license: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommerical-ShareAlike 4.0)

The map presented above was made in the continuity of the four previous ones that established an inventory of Paris Banlieues’ Cités (July 2014) and a cartographic alternative to our geographical imaginary of Paris (January 2015). This map consists in a simple graphic (and probably too approximate) exercise: tracing a rough 15-minute walking distance radius around each train station (Metro/RER/Regional train) of the “Greater Paris” — a notion only in formation at the administrative level. In such a centralized city, the connection to its center is fundamental in order to exercise a potential “right to the city.” As this map and the others show, the train lines are all oriented so to reach the center of Paris, which admittedly allows a more direct path to it; yet reinforces the pre-eminence of “fortified Paris” (see past article) to the detriment of banlieue-to-banlieue exchanges. A few tram lines allowing such displacements recently opened to support the bus system; yet, these vehicles are not comparable to the trains’ speed in any way.

The access to the train system is thus crucial to the banlieues inhabitants (80% of metropolitan Paris) in their daily experience of the city — at least for the 5 million of them that do not own a car. In this regard, the 800,000 people who live in the cités that I mapped (in red on this specific map) occupy a particularly precarious situation where they either have to stay where they live — 24% of them are unemployed — or spend several hours a day in public transportation. As the map above show, about half of the cités are situated outside these 15-minute walk radiuses and therefore have to use a bus or a tram in order to reach the train network. Rather than describing at length theoretical daily lives experience, I would like to propose three examples of contrasts between the daily trip that someone needs to accomplish to go to work when living in one of the circles and one that does not.

Example 1On the right here you can see the trip of a person who lives in the cité of Les Bergeries in Draveil (Essonne) and who has to go work in La Défense, Paris’s business district: in day time — people who clean the offices might have to take night buses, thus substantially extending the length of their commute — this person will take more than 2 hours to reach their work place, while a person living nearby (on the left) but closer to the train (RER) station will only take one hour to accomplish the same commute.

Example 2 The contrast of the second example is less about time and more about convenience: a person living in the populated cité of Les Bosquets (30,000 inhabitants) in Clichy-sous-Bois (Seine St. Denis) will need to use four different means of transportation to go work at a hospital in Montrouge (immediate South suburb of Paris), while another living near the train (RER) station will only need to change once to reach the same destination.

Example 3 A cité like La Plaine in Clamart (Hauts de Seine) is not excessively far from the center of Paris from a geographical standpoint. Yet, it will take an hour and ten minutes for one of its inhabitants to reach the restaurant where they work in Nation, while it will only take 40 minutes for someone living in the richer town of Sceaux, closer to the train (RER), despite the same geographical distance.

There could be many more examples, and they would deserve to come from actual experience from encountered people, rather than screenshots of the RATP (Paris’s public transportation company) website. We also ought to say that there are many cities in the world where a one hour, or one hour and half commute is relatively common. However, what is important to observe, beyond the absolute value of commuting time, is the difference of this time between a given city’s inhabitants. In the case of Paris, this difference is strong between people who live inside “Fortress Paris,” people in the Banlieues who are well connected with the public transportation network, and those who are not. Such a difference significantly increases the spatial segregation that is already at work through its urban and architectural condition.

The Banlieue Inventory (The Funambulist 2014)

The Funambulist Magazine Launch Event at e-flux on Thursday 13th August

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I am very happy to officially announced that, after several months of dedicated collaborative work, The Funambulist is now ready to take the next step and to become a bimestrial printed and digital magazine. The blog and the podcast (Archipelago) will remain operative, and my full-time job will now consist in being the editor of this new magazine, which I hope you will enjoy and support. The first issue is dedicated to militarized cities and include great articles and projects from the Funambulist’s old (Nora Akawi, Mohamed Elshahed, Sadia Shirazi, Demilit, Philippe Theophanidis, and James Martin) and newer collaborators (Mona Fawaz, Mona Harb, Ahmad Gharbieh, Zulaikha Ayub, Ylan Vo, and Maeve Elder).

LAUNCHING EVENT AT e-flux (NEW YORK) / AUGUST 13, 2015, 7PM

Launching event at
e-flux
311 East Broadway – New York
Thursday 13th August – 7PM

Presentation of the magazine by LÉOPOLD LAMBERT

Presentation of their articles by
SADIA SHIRAZI (1/ Sept. 2015: Militarized Cities)
OLIVIA AHN (2/ Nov. 2015: Suburban Geographies)
MINH-HA T. PHAM (3/ Jan. 2016: Clothing Politics)

Join us for a few drinks after the presentation.
The first issue of the magazine will be available for purchase.

Poster

The Funambulist Magazine Launch at e-flux / Listen to the Presentations + a Few Photos

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We happily launched The Funambulist Magazine on August 13 at e-flux (New York) in the presence of several dozens of friends and intrigued readers. Following are a few photographs, as well as the presentations given that night. You can listen to the full presentation which includes my introduction to the magazine, as well as the three first issue, or specifically listen to each of the three presentations (marked on the file above) given by Sadia Shirazi about the militarization of Lahore (Funambulist Magazine 01/Sept15: Militarized Cities), Olivia Ahn about the american suburbia as a spatial apparatus producing gender (Funambulist Magazine 02/Nov15: Suburban Geographies), and Minh-Ha T. Pham about a particular high heel shoe that supposes the existence of a standardized “Asian foot” (Funambulist Magazine 03/Jan16: Sartorial Politics).

PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE EVENT ///

OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERA

OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERA

OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERA

OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERA all photos above by Hiroko Nakatani

IMG_7919

IMG_7929Photos by Martin Byrne

Photo by Mohammad Salemy
Photo by Mohammad Salemy


Hannibal Directive and Economy of Lives: Making Sense of Black Friday in Gaza

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Article commissioned and published by Warscapes on July 30, 2015 about the “Black Friday” report by Forensic Architecture and Amnesty International and the links that can be drawn between the Palestinian and African American struggles.

Part 1: Hannibal Directive

On July 2, 2015, architect and intellectual Eyal Weizman gave a lecture at the Médecins Sans Frontières headquarters in Paris in which he presented the latest research of Forensic Architecture. Since 2012, this think tank, founded and directed by Weizman at Goldsmiths University of London, has investigated several dozen geopolitical events for which the “testimony” of architecture and/or objects was interpreted in order to be presented as evidence for prosecution of state responsibility in these events. A few of these cases investigate Israeli and U.S. drone strikes, respectively in Gaza and Pakistan. One involves the deliberate lack of assistance given to a drifting migrant boat in the Mediterranean Sea. Yet another focuses on a former concentration camp buried in former Yugoslavia.

The organization’s most recent research consists of the reconstruction of events in Gaza that immediately followed the capture of an Israeli soldier on August 1, 2014, during the so-called “Operation Protective Edge” (which killed 2,220 Palestinians, including 1,492 civilians, and displaced more than 500,000 others in July and August 2014). The comprehensive and meticulously documented report covering a single day in the conflict has now been released in the form of a collaborative online publication by Forensic Architecture and Amnesty International under the name “Black Friday.” 

The captured Israeli soldier, Lieutenant Hadar Goldin, was part of a group of soldiers deployed in Rafah that engaged in a firefight with a group of Hamas fighters. Goldin was abducted during the fighting. As the report explains, the memory of the 2011 asymmetrical deal brokered between Hamas and the Israeli government to free French-Israeli prisoner and IDF soldier Gilad Shalit – captured in June 2006 and exchanged for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners – seems to have weighed heavily in the Israeli High Command’s subsequent decision on the heels of Goldin’s capture: A secret order conceived to be used in case of the kidnapping of a soldier, known since 1982 as the “Hannibal Directive,” was subsequently issued to Israeli troops.

According to the report, the directive states the following: “The kidnapping must be stopped by all means even at the price of hitting and harming our own forces.” The subtext is almost explicit here: the Israeli army reserves the right to kill its own soldier to avoid his or her capture. As Weizman pointed out in his lecture, this triggers a rather paradoxical situation in which Hamas fighters are trying to protect the Israeli soldier while the Israeli army engages “all means” to kill him. The heavy Israeli Airforce bombardment of Gaza that followed Goldin’s abduction – about 2,000 bombs and shells – killed between 135 to 200 Palestinians.

Thanks to skills usually belonging to the realm of civil architecture and filmmaking, Forensic Architecture was able to coordinate, both spatially and temporally, numerous photographs and films shot from the ground in Rafah. In doing so, not only did the team manage to reconstitute the terror experienced by the Palestinians living in the vicinity of the bombings, but it was also able to produce a certain amount of evidence backing the narrative of the Israeli army attempting to kill its own soldier rather than see him abducted. Understanding the bombardments’ precise location and time, and cross-referencing these with with the excavation of Hamas tunnels later undertaken by the Israeli Army and the time of the kidnapping, allowed Forensic Architecture to assert that the bombings’ target was the likely the subterranean paths used by the escaping Hamas fighters and their prisoner. The evidence contradicts assertions made by the Israeli High Command in a report attesting to the immediate death of its soldier – right after he was abducted – as Weizman explains. The report was based on a dubious analysis of Goldin’s blood, which was found on his jacket in one of the discovered tunnels. In this light, the zeal of the Israeli army to declare its soldier’s early death can be seen as an attempt to discredit any claim that it attempted to kill him.

The Forensic Architecture/Amnesty International report is brilliant in its thoroughness, as well as in the means it employed to produce its evidence, especially since the think tank is mostly comprised of architects, filmmakers, photographers and artists, not lawyers. Having roughly introduced the report’s findings, I recommend its complete reading and would now like to attempt an analysis of what I perceive as the core of the problem revealed by the dreadful application of the “Hannibal Directive”: something I will call the “economy of lives.”

Part 2: Economy of Lives

The Hannibal Directive exists because of the historical asymmetrical characteristics of prisoner exchanges between the Israeli government and Palestinian and Lebanese political groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. The armed sections of these groups evidently rely on this precise asymmetrical relationship and undertake kidnappings of one or multiple Israeli soldiers when possible to negotiate the liberation of several Palestinians held in Israeli prisons. However, the economy of lives that can be perceived through this asymmetry is profoundly disturbing. The hidden message in the enunciation of the 2011 Shalit exchange is the following: One Israeli life is worth 1,027 Palestinian lives. The very fact that many of us know Shalit’s name, but not one of the 1,027 liberated Palestinian prisoners’, is symptomatic. In the case of “Black Friday,” this economy of lives exposes its violence through even more extreme and perverse forms: for the Israeli army, 135 to 200 Palestinian lives are worth ending in order to end an Israeli one, so to avoid freeing Palestinian prisoners.

We should not think of the concept of economy of lives as a retrospective reading of the Israeli Army’s crimes: This logic is at work in most Western military decision making, as Weizman shows in his book The Least of All Possible Evils (Verso 2011) through interviews with Human Rights Watch consultant Marc Garlasco, a former Pentagon “chief of high-value targeting” during the first years of the 2003 US war in Iraq. For each airstrike against an Iraqi political or military figure that Garlasco designed, he had to follow a “correct balance of civilian casualties in relation to the military value of a mission. ” In other words, there is a number of civilians the US army allows itself to kill as “collateral damage” when targeting a strategic assassination. In Iraq, this number was 30, Garlasco reveals. “In this system of calculation,” writes Weizman, “twenty-nine deaths designates a threshold. Above it, in the eyes of the US military lawyers, is potentially ‘unlawful killing’; below it, ‘necessary sacrifice.’” Here, again, lives are disincarnated into statistics calculated in relation to military and ideological objectives.

In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian exchange of prisoners that motivated this reflection, it might first appear that the asymmetry of a deal like the one reached to release Shalit constitutes a rare inversion of the asymmetry of power manufactured by the Apartheid and continuous occupation (in the West Bank) and siege (in Gaza) that Palestinians have to suffer on a daily basis. On the contrary, I believe that it is the same asymmetry at work: the conception of an economy of lives in which some are worth less than others. This is the very foundation of racism, and not “simply” in Palestine, as we are reminded daily.

On April 24, 2015, Senegalese novelist Fatou Diome, who was invited to speak on French television to give her insights about the hundreds of migrant deaths in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, let out a tragic scream: “If the people who die were White, the entire Earth would tremble!” A few days before this poignant declaration, the black life of Freddie Gray, ended by the Baltimore Police on April 12th, had been put in a balance in which the destruction of a few storefronts appeared to weigh more. The discursive opposition of a “broken spine” (in reference to Gray’s murder by the police) and “broken windows” (in reference to the destructive reaction by some members of Baltimore’s African American community) illustrated well the economy at stake here. On April 27th, a state of emergency was declared on Baltimore, thus implementing a curfew from 10pm to 5am that lasted nine days. The State of Exception however, does not correspond to this spectacular temporary suspension of rights as much as it characterizes the normalized territorialization of sub-citizenry – whether explicit like in Palestine, or implicit like in many American and European cities – attributed to marked bodies. The political movement Black Lives Matter was created in the form of a scream against this sub-citizen status and the low value of Black lives implied in confrontations with police officers.

In January 2015, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls described the situation of France’s banlieues (suburbs) as “a territorial, social, ethnic apartheid.” Although this term is inappropriate in this case, insofar as it tends to normalize political struggles in South Africa and Palestine, we can only acknowledge the gravity of the situation of these peripheral neighborhoods that host an important part of the French Arab and Black population. Like for Baltimore in 2015, a state of emergency was declared in November 2005 in some of the suburbs after several cars and buildings were burnt following the violent deaths of two teenagers, Bouna Traoré and Zyed Benna, electrocuted when being illegitimately chased by the police on October 25, 2005. Here, again, the economy of lives and things had attributed more value to things and Police lives than in Brown and Black lives.

Conclusion

This article does not seek comparison where it should not exist: the bombardments on Gaza, as well as the continuous incarceration of its 1.8 million inhabitants, most of which are refugees of an almost seventy year old ethnic cleansing, cannot be compared in essence with the current situation of Brown and Black lives in North America and Europe, however precarious these are, and despite the history of colonialism and slavery that this situation is founded on. What is common in these two cases are the profoundly racist structures that establish, with various degrees of explicitness, situations in which some lives are worth less than others.

The conclusions of the “Black Friday” report enjoin the Israeli army to reform its system of investigation, as well as recommend that foreign governments start criminal investigations into the perpetuators responsible for the hundreds of Palestinian civilian deaths. These types of conclusions are appropriate to Amnesty International’s geopolitical ambitions and should be welcomed as such. However, as the members of Forensic Architecture know well, the trial and sometimes condemnation of individuals for crimes that occur through systemic logic such as an imbalanced economy of lives do not make this logic more fragile – sometimes, it even makes it stronger in the claim that a system can make regarding healthy self-regulation. What is at stake in Palestine and elsewhere is the balancing of the economy of lives at both a legal and imaginary level. Only this agenda, expressed in the most literal manner in the name of the Black Lives Matter movement, can veritably challenge the structure of racism and its dreadful effects.

The Banlieue Battleground: Designing the French Suburbs for Police/Military Interventions

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nb. Although the term of banlieue can define all suburbs in France, I use this word here to specifically talk about the suburban neighborhoods inhabited by a population in economic precariousness and composed, for an important part, of French citizens of North and West African ancestry, as well as more recent immigrants. Although my thoughts are not fully in sync with the political party of the Indigènes de la République (The Republic’s Indigenous), I will also use this term to refer to this population for its useful provocative expression: by referring to colonialism, this phrase connects the current situation to national history since a great majority of the Indigenous’ families experienced French colonialism between the 19th and 20th centuries.

This article is a prelude to an article written by Hacène Belmessous in the second issue of The Funambulist Magazine dedicated to the politics of the suburbs, and entitled “French Banlieues: Neighborhoods in State of Exception.” I commissioned him to write this short essay after reading his book, Opération Banlieues (La Découverte, 2010) that examined, in the most intense years of the Sarkozy administration, the potential scenarios that would lead the French army to intervene within the banlieues of the country. Although the antagonism between the French government and the Indigenous has always been strong, the seven years of Sarkozy’s governance (two as Minister of Interior Affairs, and five as President) corresponds to the explicit climax of this antagonism. This is why, the first chapter of Belmessous’s book written in the form of a fiction, appear so credible: in a given part of the Paris banlieue, a few young individuals engage in live fire with the police, killing three officers of the infamous BAC (Brigade Anti-Criminalité), and thus triggering a carefully prepared political process of emergency leading to the deployment of the army in various neighborhoods of the country.

After describing this troubling yet plausible scenario involving armed forces deployed against an entire part of the French population, Belmessous presents his research that consists for an important part of interviews with various figures of the army, the gendarmerie (the military part of the French police, polemically transferred under the authority of the Ministry of Interior Affairs by Sarkozy), and the police. In this regard, it is interesting to observe that the various military officers interviewed present many explicit and implicit signs of disagreement to their potential deployment on the national territory. On the contrary, the various members of the police interviewed appear in sync with the extreme antagonism proposed as politics by Sarkozy and the large part of the French right-wing that verbally and politically attempt to compete with its extreme counterpart, the Front National, which has been proposing the vision of a racist police state for decades.

DSC_0090 Training center of Saint-Astier / Photo by Louise Fessard for Mediapart

In order to be prepared to intervene in the Banlieue battleground, the gendarmerie uses the training center of Saint-Astier in the South-West of France (see the extensive article by Louise Fessard in Mediapart) as site of experimentation. Like many of its counterparts of Potemkine-villages — Chicago in the Negev for the Israeli army, the various MOUT training sites for the US army, those of the Dutch police, etc. — this training center involves different urban typologies in which the police-soldiers can practice exercise. As written in another article dedicated to this specific question, the way the police officers who act as insurgent during drills, is particularly symptomatic of the way actual insurgent’s claim are systematically discarded, and how racism operates in the anticipation of who these insurgents, as well as what their claim might be. In this regard, the satirical news TV Show Le Petit Journal, recently showed how, during a demonstration of this kind of drills in front of the current Minister of Interior Affairs, the police officers acting as insurgents were screaming “Viva Algeria,” thus presuming of the bodies that the gendarmerie would encounter in a real situation, and associating their claim to a fantasized allegiance to their country of origin.

Excerpt of Le Petit Journal (10/08/14)

Beyond the scenario of a military intervention in the Banlieues, Belmessous describes how, in the recent years, the police has been integrated in the urban decisions regarding the renovation of some Banlieue neighborhood. The research behind Opération Banlieues begins with a hearsay, which remains unproved as of today, but whose resonance to other verified interventions of security and control agenda in the renovation of the banlieues, gives it enough plausibility to be recounted: Belmessous describes how in the middle of the year 2000s, while urban renovation often rhymed with tabula rasa, and thus the demolition of entire housing buildings (“barres” ie. horizontal towers, and “tours” ie. vertical towers), the Ministry of Interior Affairs intervened to demolish one particular building against the choice that had been made for another one in the neighborhood. This choice would have been motivated to facilitate the access and intervention of the police. Similarly, in the forthcoming article written for The Funambulist Magazine, Belmessous describes how it makes no doubt that the streets that have been built in the green ‘plain’ of La Grande Borne (see below) have more to do with the possibility for the police to move its vehicles than for the firemen to access the buildings, as it has been claimed.

IMG-PG Banlieue neighborhood of La Grande Borne in Grigny (South Paris)

Examples of the presence of police officers at the design table for the renovation of the Banlieues in company of urban planners, architects and social-housing developers, are plethora. Such intervention resonates with 1970s architectural theories of “Design Against Crime” (see past article) as defined by architects like Oscar Newman and Barry Poyner. Their ambition consists in using architecture’s capacity to control visibility and filter bodies, in order to police collective housing spaces in addition of the establishment of local rules (a quota of children and youngsters to be allowed to live in these neighborhoods for instance).

The police has a strong sense of space. Like the army, it deploys itself in it, it controls it, it appropriates it. There is therefore no doubt that its participation in the design of entire neighborhoods like the Banlieues triggers effectively drastic changes in the organization of bodies in space. Yet, we should refrain from seeing such a participation as a corruption of the noble discipline we assume architecture to be. On the contrary, I would to argue, that when the police and the architect becomes one and only entity, it is the very essence of architecture that is accomplished: its violent inherent characteristics find their full-use and its ability to subsequently control the bodies it hosts is optimal. In the case of the Banlieues, it also sanctify the absolute separation of the police/architect and its inhabitants. The necessary antagonism that results from this separation is also what feeds it, since it creates and fuel the delinquency and criminality — something admittedly difficult to describe beyond the mythical narratives that characterize them on a daily basis — against which it claims to be organized. Only the dissolution of this rhetorical and political antagonism, which materializes, among other things, through the withdrawal of the police from any territorial organization can claim to “solve problems,” and actively destroy the segregationist agency of space in French cities.

Who Is the Scum Now? Illegal Paris Municipalities Regarding Social Housing

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Map created for the purpose of this article (see the full version below) /  Download it here in high resolution (8 MB) / (license: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommerical-ShareAlike 4.0)

This article and map are in the continuity of the five others made in the past year (cf. “The Banlieue Archipelago,” “Another Paris,” and “15-minute walk from a train station” maps) and, more generally, to the on-going series of articles about the Paris banlieues (suburbs).

On October 26, 2005, recently nominated Minister of Interior Affairs (i.e. chief of the police), Nicolas Sarkozy, who will be elected President two years later, was visiting the banlieue of Argenteuil when he addressed a person at her window: “You’re tired of this scum [racaille], aren’t you? Well, we’re going to get rid of it for you!” (see video). The next day, Bouna Traoré and Zyed Benna, two teenagers from Clichy-sous-Bois, died of electrocution while they were trying to run away from the BAC (Brigade Anti-Criminalité, i.e. a particularly aggressive branch of the police in the banlieues), chasing them illegitimately (see past article). These two events sparked the important revolts of the banlieues that were only responded with a state of emergency and more police control. Although Sarkozy’s policies and speeches have been consistently relying on fundamentally racist and colonial principles — many of uf will remember the 2010 speech of Grenoble about immigration or the 2007 one in Dakar about “Africa, not having yet entered history” — we can give him the benefit of the doubt that his definition of scum (racaille) consists in people despising the law and arrogantly disobeying it, regardless of their race.

Let’s thus keep this definition in mind while introducing a piece of legislation that directly addresses the social (and by extension, racial) segregation that spatially organizes Paris and its banlieues: The SRU Law (Solidarity and Urban Renewal), voted in December 2000, obliges each municipality counting more than 3,500 inhabitants — other exemptions include the impossibility for a municipality to build more on its land — to comply with the ratio of 20% of its total housing to be social housing. The map presented below shows the quasi-totality of Paris’s urban area and its municipalities, including the 20 arrondissements that compose Paris proper. Municipalities showed in green are compliant with this legislation, and those in bright green even includes more than 25% of social housing — the 95 cités showed on the map in white are, of course, almost exclusively in these municipalities. On the contrary, the map shows no less than 149 municipalities that are not compliant with the law, including 60 that do not even reach a percentage of 10% (in red). For instance, Sarkozy’s city, Neuilly-sur-Seine — he was its mayor between 1983 and 2002 — counts less than 5% (1,435 out of 30,448) of social housing. Hence the question that gives its title to this article: “Who is the scum now?”

The difference between the people characterized by Sarkozy as scum, and these illegal municipalities is that the first ones tend to go to jail when judged guilty of the crimes of which they are accused; disobeying mayors, on the other hand, have to pay a fine, something that many seems to widely prefer rather than integrating a more important amount of socially precarious individuals and families as their constituents. In this regard, this failure of the means of coercion reminds us of the ones that are often applied to banks and corporations that can easily buy their right to despise the law. The result of such policies is the reinforcement of territorial segregation and the constitution of two blocks that were already visible in the map showing the wealth disparities of the city but the relation to this law render even more visible: some municipalities might be wealthier than others but part of them uses this wealth to buy their way out of their legal obligation. The wealth they accumulate while not providing the public service of aid to housing, as well as the production of real estate value generated from the non-mix of middle and upper class housing with social one, largely covers the fine, thus perpetuating the capitalist logic that makes the rich, richer, and the poor, poorer.

It ought to be noted that, although this article emphasized Sarkozy’s (and thus the French political right-wing’s) important responsibility in the application of this logic, a brief research of the illegal municipalities’ past and present mayors, show that he is far from being the only one to blame: in fact, several mayors members of the Socialist Party never complied with this law that was drafted by Lionel Jospin’s government (1997-2002). Similarly, the current Hollande/Valls administration (Socialist Party) did not engage any program of desegregation of the banlieues (in Paris or in other French cities), favoring instead policies whose differences with Sarkozy’s ones are to be found in the words more than in the actions. The current Minister of Housing and of Equality between Territories — an ambitious title, also far from having the means to reach such an ambition — Sylvia Pinel seems to be a marginal and powerless member of the government. At a time where the “Greater Paris” is being made, banlieue housing, just like transportation, should be considered as absolute priority of any government and municipalities that, indeed, would like to promote this claimed equality of territories. The map below, on the other hand, show us another reality: ones that let illegal municipalities do as they will, while others are the direct victims of the resulting segregation. Although the two blocks showed on this map should be refined to include the local social segregation within each municipality, it reveals the obstinacy many mayors show when it comes to equality.

The Banlieue Inventory (The Funambulist 2014)

The Unequal Access to Fortress Paris: Different Gate Typologies for Poor and Wealthy Municipalities

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Map created for the purpose of this article (see the full version below) /  Download it here in high resolution (10 MB) / (license: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommerical-ShareAlike 4.0)

Continuing the current series about Paris and its banlieues (suburbs), here is a new map illustrating why I call the Paris municipality (only a fifth of the total Parisian population), “Fortress Paris.” The “Boulevard Périphérique” that surrounds Paris is a 35-kilometer long highway that, to a few exceptions (mainly the two forests of Boulogne and Vincennes), mark the separation between the Paris municipality and suburban municipalities. Such a wide gap built in 1954 creates a “canyon” (see a past article about urban highways as canyons) that recalls its former function of fortifications. In fact, the same route was formerly used by fortified walls supposed to defend Paris against foreign armies. Built between 1841 and 1844, following a decision of the infamous Adolphe Thiers who will order the slaughter of the Paris Commune thirty years later (see the many past articles), the walls were finally destroyed after the First World War and the liminal land of Paris remained relatively empty until the 1950s.

The map presented below is, of course, only so much illustrative, insofar that it implies a pedestrian access to Paris, something that only a little amount of bodies experience on a daily basis, most people using the subway or regional train to access Fortress Paris (see past map). Nevertheless,this map aims at illustrating the unequal logic at work in the organization of urban space in Paris, as well as the imaginary it creates for the population discriminated by it. The three symbols showing the gates to access the city center on the map represent three different gate typologies that have a significantly different impact on the bodies crossing them. Rounds show a condition where the Périphérique is underground, thus allowing easy if not unconscious crossing. Squares are bridges that cross over the highway; they are almost always wide but don’t prevent the separative gap to be fully marked and the traffic noise reinforces the uncomfortable feeling of the crossing. Triangles, finally, imply a crossing under the Périphérique, which is by far the least inviting option: often dark, noisy and smelly, the border is materialized not only by a medieval interpretation of the gate, but also by an atmospheric condition calling for all senses to experience it as such. Bodies are not equal when it comes to the feeling of insecurity and it is easy to understand that some of them (women for instance, but not exclusively) only cross these gates reluctantly and with a feeling of strong anxiety.

A quick look at the map will allow readers to understand the logic at work here: to a few exceptions, the most economically precarious municipalities in the North of Paris (Clichy, Saint Ouen, Saint Denis, Aubervilliers, Pantin, and Le Pré Saint Gervais) are linked to Fortress Paris through an under-bridge crossing, while the Western wealthiest municipalities (Boulogne Billancourt, Neuilly sur Seine, and Levallois Perret) are linked to the city center through either wide bridges or overground paths. The Southern municipalities, hosting working and low-middle classes also alternate between bridges and under bridge gates. Only the Eastern municipalities seem to indicate a breakage of this logic; this can be partially explained by a  few recent renovations that built platforms over the highway and that can be explained through the rampant (although admittedly slower than in American cities for instance) gentrification of these municipalities (Montreuil in particular) by a middle-class young population (see past map to understand the economic disparities between Parisian municipalities).

Although I would like to insist once again that this map tells us more about the logic at work than conditions that most Parisians have to experience on a daily basis, this demonstration of inequity tells us something powerful about the denial of the “right to the city.” This manifests through a double component: the denial of decentralization of a city that insists on its status intramuros (inside the walls) and the denial of access, or rather the unequal access, to this same urbanity for those who live outside of it. Once again, architecture (through its infrastructural version here) materializes the conditions of such a denial and unequal access: it either manifests its presence through its weaponized aspect to block or discourage its crossing or, on the contrary, withdraws to its minimal formation to facilitate access. Although this discriminatory tactic is particularly blatant in the case of Paris because the Périphérique surrounds the city, we can see similar denial of the right to the city in many others, in particular in the United States (see this article in the Washington Post) where the racialized and social unequal organization of the bodies in the city is often even more flagrant.

The Banlieue Inventory (The Funambulist 2014)

Comprehensive Map of Occupied Jerusalem: From Ramallah to Bethlehem

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Map below created by Léopold Lambert for The Funambulist (2015) / license: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommerical-ShareAlike 4.0 / A similar map, more focused on the center of Jerusalem itself was published in The Funambulist Magazine‘s first issue to illustrate the article “Jerusalem: Dismantling Phantasmagorias, Constructing Imaginaries” by Nora Akawi.

The Green line represents the 1949 Armistice line and used to separate the Israeli territory from the Transjordanian governance. In 1967, East Jerusalem was invaded along the entire West Bank, and it remains occupied as of today. The red line represents the Apartheid wall started by the Ariel Sharon administration during the Second Intifada. The “C” dots are checkpoints that Israeli cars have no problem crossing, while Palestinians require (rare) permits to cross the wall. The dashed-line represents the Jerusalem tramway, built between 2002 and 2010 and that links West Jerusalem to the Israeli settlements in the Palestinian part of the city. When looking at the map, it will clearly appear why, although Ramallah and Bethlehem are only separated by 20 kilometers, it takes about 50 minutes for a Palestinian car to go from one to another.

Two weeks ago, Al Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest site of Islam, located on the Haram (Mosques Esplanade) in the Old City, was attacked by the Israeli police that threw teargas grenades inside the building for the second time in the recent months. The map below shows a zoom on the Haram complex in East Jerusalem, as well as the Western Wall, holy site of Judaism. As a reminder, the Second Intifada started in 2000 after Ariel Sharon provocatively set foot on the Haram to show the Israeli dominance over all sites in Palestine. Similarly, dozens of Israelis, many of which are afiliated to the Likud (Netanyahu’s political party) entered the Haram under the Israeli army’s protection as another invasive precedent (see article on Ma’an News). I also experienced the evacuation of the Haram when I first visited it, eight years ago, after three Orthodox Jews had penetrated in it, triggering the deployment of Israeli soldiers on site. Let it be clear that everyone should theoretically be able to access the holy site, whatever the religion or nationality (and this includes the Palestinians “on the other side of the wall” and in Gaza, as well as the Palestinian refugees in the world), but the current conditions of the Israeli Apartheid make it impossible for an Israeli Jew to innocently set foot on the Haram, his/her presence always being accompanied by a military intervention. The various spatial and political apparatuses that implement all scales of the Apartheid are therefore to be destroyed first to allow a religious coexistence on Jerusalem’s holy sites.

Map of the Haram in the old city of Jerusalem:

Haram Jerusalem (The Funambulist 2015)

For more information about the recent Israeli attacks on Al Aqsa Mosque, see this documentary on Al Jazeera (September 16, 2015):

The Funambulist / Archipelago in the Western Balkans and Hungary: A Brief Photographic Report

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Between September 22nd and October 3rd, I traveled on the roads of four former Yugoslavian Republics (Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia, and Slovenia), as well as Hungary, in order to document the historical and current (geo)political relationship between architecture/urbanism and the bodies. The four main historical eras that were discussed in seven podcast conversations are roughly summarized here:
– The Second World War, during which Serbia and Slovenia were annexed or occupied by the Axis armies (Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria), while Croatia and Bosnia formed “the Independent State of Croatia,” often referred as a “Nazi puppet-state” that persecuted its Serbian minority. Serbian and Communist Partisans resistance led to the reformation of Yugoslavia in 1945.
– The Socialist Era, in particular the years during which Tito was President of Yugoslavia (1953-1980), a period of time that now corresponds for many as a nostalgic memory of prosperity and co-existence between the different ethnic groups of the region. My ignorance does not allow me to understand if it is a retrospective idealized memory — the generation born a few years after Tito’s death contribute to this narrative as well — or not.
– The 1990s wars, triggered by the political conflicts between the Serbian Nationalist government of Slobodan Milošević (1989-2000) and aspiring independentist republics (Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, Bosnia & Herzegovina in 1992, Kosovo in 1999) counting a Serbian minority (except for Slovenia). The dreadful war in Bosnia, as well as the subsequent ambiguous partition of the country between the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (where the ethnic cleansing of 1992-1995 against Bosniaks, i.e. Bosnian Muslims and, to a lesser degree, Bosnian Croats was crystallized by the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreements) was the most discussed during these conversations.
– The current era and its materialization of various borders. Part of the former Yugoslavian territory (namely, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia), as well as Albania are exceptional in their geopolitical situation: they are “surrounded” by countries member of the European Union without being members themselves. In the current displacements of bodies from the Middle-East and Central Asia towards Europe, these Balkanic countries exercise the E.U.’s externalized politics of immigration, registering refugees and economic migrants, as well as detaining some of them in various facilities, as we previously discussed with Lucie Bacon in a conversation entitled “Collecting Migrant Experiences at the Walls of the European Union.” The recent temporary shut-down of the border between Serbia and Hungary, followed a few days later by a similar action on the border between Serbia and Croatia is particularly symptomatic of the strong contrast between the fluidity of the Shengen space’s internal borders and the fortified characteristics of its external ones.

Following this far-too-brief summary, is a photographic series of this trip that, hopefully, can provide a more incarnated vision of this research.

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Map of The Funambulist / Archipelago research trip in the Western Balkans and Hungary. Dark-grey countries are part of the European Union and the Shengen space, medium grey are just part of the European Union, light grey are part of none. The red line insists on the heavily-monitored borders of the Shengen space, and its continuous part between Hungary and Serbia represents the wall recently built by the Hungarian government (see photo above). The dotted white line represent the former sovereign space of Yugoslavia (1918-1991).

All following photographs by Léopold Lambert (2015):

SEPTEMBER 22nd: ZAGREB ///

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (1)

SEPTEMBER 23rd: FROM ZAGREB TO SARAJEVO ///

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (2)

In the thickness of the line (see past articles) between Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. Many of the borders between the former Republics of Yugoslavia are materialized by rivers, thus embodying a thick paradoxical border between them.

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (3)

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (4)

When driving on the roads of North-West Bosnia (in the so-called “Republika Srpska”), one encounters dozens of ruins along the way. As explained by Selma Porobić later that day, these houses are likely to belong to Bosnian Croats who were the unfortunate pawns of a secret deal between Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman, the then-President of the newly independent Croatia. Despite the war that was occurring on Croatian ground between the Yugoslav (i.e. Serbian) Army and the Croatian one, these two politicians made a deal to the expense of Bosnia, that allowed the evacuation to Croatia and the naturalization of many Bosnian Croats while the Serbian troops could consolidate their occupation of this part of Bosnia. These Croatian houses were neither fully destroyed nor reconstructed and stands today as witnesses of the Croatian complicity in the Serbian shattering of Bosnia.

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (5)

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (6)

Crossing the industrial city of Zenica before reaching Sarajevo. Later that day, recording of the podcast conversation “Forcefully Displaced Bodies in Bosnia: From the 1992-95 War to Contemporary Fortress Europe” with Selma Porobić, director of the Centre for refugee and IDP studies at the Sarajevo University.

SEPTEMBER 24th: SARAJEVO /// 

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (7)

Attending to the Eid prayer in the European country with the largest percentage of Muslim population (40%).

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (8)

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (9)

The city of Sarajevo is surrounded by high hills, a topographical quality that was one of the main component that allowed its siege by the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian militias between 1992 and 1996. Looking to the West, one can visualize the several historical layers of the city: the Ottoman center, the Austro-Hungarian city, the most contemporary part of it, and further away, the Socialist city.

SEPTEMBER 25: SARAJEVO ///

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (10)

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (11)

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (12)

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (13)

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (14)

SEPTEMBER 26: SARAJEVO – SREBRENICA – BELGRADE ///

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (14') The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (14'')

A podcast conversation in the form of a walk in Sarajevo in company of local architect Mensur Demir, now published under the name “A War that Shaped a City, a City that Shaped a War.” The four buildings showed above (Electrical Management Building, Holiday Inn, and the “Twin Towers”) were all designed by Ivan Straus and were both witnesses and targets of the siege.

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (15)

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (16)

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (17)

In July 1995, in Srebrenica, the so-called Army of Republika Srpska (Bosian Serbs) coldly assassinated more than 8,000 Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) men and boys defenseless refugees (the Dutch blue-helmets failed to defend them). More than 6,000 of them are buried in this memorial.

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (18)

In the thickness of the border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Despite the ‘localness’ of this border (many seems to cross it by bike for instance), the search was thorough and exhaustive.

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (19)

On the road to Belgrade.

SEPTEMBER 27th: BELGRADE ///

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (20)

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (20')

Yugoslav Ministry of Defense bombed by NATO in 1999 following the deadly intervention of the Yugoslav (i.e. Serbian) army in Kosovo. In a strong symbol of capitalist developments, a Trump hotel is planned to be built in lieu of this impressive urban ruin.

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (21')

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (21)

Another drastic capitalist development in the city can be found in the Belgrade Waterfront project against which a demonstration was organized on this day. We later discuss about this particular project, as well as other aspect of Belgrade’s spatial politics in a podcast conversation with Ana Džokić, architect and co-founder of Stealth.unlimited (to be published next week).

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (22)

In the small refugee camp of the center of Belgrade, young Iranians are playing volleyball while waiting for a distribution of goods by the Red Cross.

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (23)

Visit of the massive Socialist residential part of the city, Novi Belgrade (New Belgrade) with Dubravka Sekulic.

SEPTEMBER 28th: AT THE SERBIAN-HUNGARIAN BORDER – BUDAPEST

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (25)

New 4-meter tall wall built by the Hungarian government along the 150 kilometers of the country’s border with Serbia.

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (26)

Podcast conversation recording with Tamas Bodoky, journalist and founder of the online news platform atlatszo.hu that resists against the legal restrictions of the freedom of press as initiated by the Viktor Orbán administration in 2010. We discuss about the Nationalist politics of the last five years in Hungary, as well as the recent events that saw an aggressive control and policing of refugees in their crossing of the country towards Austria.

SEPTEMBER 29: LJUBLJANA

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (27)The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (27')

Visit of the city with Urska Jurman, trying to focus on the various designed apparatuses that facilitates police control in the city. Later that day, I record a podcast conversation with Miloš Kosec, a young local architect whose thesis was investigating the ruin as a potent architectural typology. Together, we talk about three particular historical examples involving the Italian and German annexation/occupation of Slovenia during the Second World War.

SEPTEMBER 30: LJUBLJANA

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (28)

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (29)

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (30)

I was invited by the association Obrat to give a lecture about militarized cities in a reclaimed garden that was originally promised to a housing development project. More of the garden can be seen in a short interview about the lecture released by the Slovene TV.

OCTOBER 1st: ZAGREB ///

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (31)

Two podcast conversations recorded. One with Iva Marčetić, a local architect who works with the organization Right to the City, as well as anti-fascist movements, in an attempt to fully mix the practice of architecture and political activism. The other, with Ana Dana Beroš, about the current political situation regarding the refugees in Croatia, as well as for her exhibition/publication Intermundiathat investigates the island of Lampedusa in its tension between the suppressive politics of Fortress Europe, and the aspiration to movement from thousands of economic migrants coming from various parts of Africa.

OCTOBER 2nd: ZAGREB ///

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (32)

Participation to the Think Space 2015 Unconference about new spaces of “publicness” in company of Aristide Antonas, Ana Dana Beroš, Jan Liesegang and Karin Šerman. My presentation tackles both the inherent segregative effects of architecture, as well as the absolute necessity of architects to examine the inequality of access to this notion of “publicness,” in particular from a racial and social standpoint. Later on, the roundtable moderated by Tomislav Pletenac attempts to respond to the urgency of discussion about the politics engaged against the refugees in Europe.

OCTOBER 3rd: ZAGREB ///

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (33)

Visit of three impressive residential towers nicknamed “the rockets.”

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (34)

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (35)

The Funambulist - Archipelago in the Balkans 2015 (Photo by Leopold Lambert) (36)

Wild visit of the abandoned construction site of what was planned to be a university hospital. This research trip was far too short to analyse thoroughly any of the historical and contemporary issues encountered; yet, it allowed a first approach to them that calls for others to follow. I hope that these photographs were able to provide an enriching account of the political encounters that I was able to make with various designed apparatuses.

In addition of the people already cited in this article I would like to thank the Graham Foundation, the French Institute, Kata Gaspar, Vesna Vrga, Damir Sekulic, Dea Dudič, Haris Bulič, Drazen Huterer, Kristina Božič, Polona Balantič, Matevž Čelik, Maja Vardjan, Cvetka Požar, the Oris Magazine team, and many others for their help, kindness and enthusiasm manifested in our encounter at various points of the trip. A big thank you to all of them.

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The Act of Throwing Stones: Refusing Victimhood and Materializing the Apartheid Relation

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Once again, I feel the absolute urge to write in order to join the voices gathered against the Apartheid imposed on Palestinian bodies by the Israeli government, and its recent tightening, in particular in Jerusalem itself (see recent article).

The Western mainstream Press, as usual, is preparing the appropriate conditions for the Israeli army to deploy its violence without a strong reaction from their respective governments. It does so through a verbal and pictorial narrative that depicts violent, masked and uncontrollable Palestinian youth throwing stones at Israeli soldiers and vehicles. A few other media have been providing the violence of the conditions in which these scenes have occurred, but this is not what I would like to do here. Instead, I would like to reflect on this very act of throwing stones: what does this act reveal about the state of Apartheid, and the role of Palestinians within it?

A series of new measures executed by the Netanyahu administration recently significantly increased punishment (up to four years in prisons and substantial fines) towards Palestinian that throw stones against its army. But it also constructs the legal conditions in which the Israeli army could use live fire (0.22 caliber live rounds) on stone throwers — sometimes through undercover agents as we saw yesterday — in an absolutely literal manifestation of the asymmetrical antagonism we are describing here, echoing the voluntarily “disproportionate” military response of the loose rockets launched from Gaza by heavy, precise and dreadful bombardments. Asymmetry is the most obvious way of looking at the fighting forces in presence. Nevertheless, reading the situation only through this filter constitute a mistake in the assessment of these forces through their means, and not through their very reason to fight: while the Israeli soldiers fight to enforce order in a state of Apatheid, Palestinians fight for their life as Amira Hass points out in a column yesterday in Haaretz.

The photograph above is particularly expressive of the argument that I would like to make, an argument that I hope not to be too abstract. Would anyone reasonably think that these young Palestinians are actually attempting to destroy with stones this Israeli army watchtower in the West Bank? What about when tanks and bulldozers are being stoned? It would be ridiculous to think so. Stones are like words, they don’t destroy walls, towers or any other heavy military equipment; they are used to manifest their antagonism against their target — the fact that the stones thrown are fragments of a disputed land is certainly highly symbolic too. Stones are tracers that designate that against which they stand politically, and their trajectory materializes the relation between the thrower and his/her target. Visualizing this relation, like on the photographic intervention below, allows us to think of the reciprocity of its effect. The violence of the Apartheid follow the same trajectories onto Palestinian bodies and applies itself with a much greater degree than the stone-tracers.

We should never forget the reciprocity of this relation, despite the drastic difference in the degree of violence, and the stone trajectory reminds us of this. Envisioning Palestinian bodies as absolute subjects/victims of the colonial violence, never helped to dissolute this violence. In July 2014, during the last occurrence of the dreadful Israeli siege on Gaza, I wrote a text entitled “Refraining from the Figure of Innocence” that advocated for our abandon of notions such as innocence and victimhood that both establish hierarchies between the bodies subjected to violence: children would be more innocent, and therefore more victims of the bombings, than their parents; similarly, Palestinian recognized as “non-violent” theoretically bear more credibility in their struggle than the masked, stone-thrower youth do. We can see the perversion in such thinking: the “International Opinion” pretends to wait for every Palestinian to patiently and calmly wait that they all reach the full status of victim to finally gives itself the means to intervene against the Israeli Apartheid violence.

If there is a form of hierarchy to establish within the Palestinian society, it is not one of victimhood that needs to be done, but one of responsibility. On September 30, Mahmoud Abbas announced to the UN that the Palestinian Authority will no longer abide by the 1993 Oslo Accords. As Rashid Khalidi points out, “It’s about time!“, insisting on the responsibility (if not the essence) of the PA in the crystallization of the occupation in their security efforts alongside the Israeli army. The Palestinian bourgeoisie is not the one throwing stones either. Instead it keep assembling them together in the construction of semi-luxurious buildings and gated communities in a pretended indifference (if not mimicry) of the occupation (see the article “Constructing a Bubble: The Two Sides of Ramallah,” as well as the article on the question by Tina Grandinetti in the forthcoming second issue of The Funambulist Magazine). The Palestinian responsibility in the normalization of the occupation was recently made clear, when a recent World Bank report revealed a significant drop in the Israeli economy following the 24% decrease of import of Israeli products towards the West Bank. The boycott of Israeli goods seems to have become another means for Palestinians to act against this responsibility. Many defenders of the Israeli policies think of this boycott as a form of violence and, to some degree, they are right: like stones, the boycott challenges the very foundation of the statu quo and materializes the relation between the colonizer society and the colonized one.

Throwing a stone might be seen as an act of despair, a useless form of resistance against an unmovable colonial system. However, it is a performative act — perhaps even a cathartic one but I am already talking outside of my element here — that materializes the Apartheid relation through its trajectories and that resolutely refuses the useless status of victim, to prefer the one of resistant, however little the effect. The fact that the Israeli government recently took measures against the stone throwers allows us to think that, despite the narrative they provide to the Israeli state for its pretended defensive agenda, this effect affects more the state of Apartheid than the stones’ small impact on concrete and steel would commonly suggest.

Trajectories stone Visualizing the Apartheid Relation through the stones’ trajectories / Created for this article (2015)

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London Launch of The Funambulist Magazine’s Second Issue “Suburban Geographies” on Nov. 2nd

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The (first) launch of The Funambulist Magazine’s second issue dedicated to Suburban Geographies will happen on November 2 (7 PM), at the Westminster Law & Theory Lab directed by friend Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos in London. In addition of this specific issue, I will also present the first (Militarized Cities) and third (Clothing Politics) ones, and we will be very lucky to have Professor Reina Lewis also presenting her text for the third issue.

Please RSVP by following this link.

Complete text of the invitation:

Invitation Westminster Lab

The Westminster Law & Theory Lab kindly invites you to the London Launch of The Funambulist Magazine’s Second Issue: Suburban Geographies on Monday, 2nd of November, at 7pm at The Pavilion, University of Westminster, 115 New Cavendish St, W1W 6UW

Reina Lewis is professor of Cultural Studies at London College of Fashion, and the author of Muslim Fashion: Contemporary Style Cultures (Duke University Press, 2015)

Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is the Director of the Westminster Law and Theory Lab and the author of Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere (Routeledge, 2014)

Leopold Lambert is the founder and editor of The Funambulist Magazine and the author of Weaponized Architecture: The Impossibility of Innocence (dpr-barcelona, 2012)

The Funambulist Magazine is a bimestrial publication about the political relationships of the designed environment with the bodies. It operates alongside a blog and a podcast (Archipelago) that both share the same editorial line.

List of the first four issues:
– 01 September 2015: Militarized Cities
– 02 November 2015: Suburban Geographies
– 03 January 2016: Clothing Politics
– 04 March 2016: Carceral Environments

Copies of the two first issues will be available for purchase during the event

Please stay with us after the presentation for a less formal discussion around drinks

The event is free but places are strictly limited.

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The Powerful’s Displayed Body, His Shattered Shirt, and the Fence that Protects Him

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It seems like the October 5, 2015 event at Air France no longer needs an introduction since it has been broadly relayed by the international press. It happened after the company announced that it was going to fire 3,000 employees: during a meeting with the unions, both the director of human resources and the director of the company in Orly airport were stripped off their shirts before they finally escaped from the crowd under the protection of their private security service then relayed by the police. The quasi-totality of politicians (in particular the Prime Minister Manuel Valls) and the main medias have expressed their outrage against what they considered as a violent “unacceptable” assault. The photos and videos of these two semi-naked bodies were nevertheless spread at great speed, which proves well the hypocrisy of the media that, on the one hand, condemned this event, while capitalizing on the spectacle of these two bodies’ humiliation (I have personally preferred to blur the image above to insist on this body’s social position, rather than its identity). Worse, the same politicians and journalists profusely used the term “lynching” to describe the situation in a dismissal of the actual definition of a lynching while the latter is currently manifested on Palestinian bodies living on the Western side of the Apartheid Wall. On the other hand, a few other journalists and thinkers have then reminded us of the equivalence of physical violence and the structural, capitalist one that constitutes the announced 3,000 firings and their individual and familial effects. Rather than repeating these legitimate arguments (that never seem to be fathomed by those who do not experience structural violence) I would like to address two components of this event: the pictorial display of the body stripped from its shirt, and the fence that it attempts to climb up in order to seek protection of the police on the other side.

Last week, at a meeting in Saint Denis preparing the October 31st Paris March for Dignity and Against Racism (Marche de la dignité et contre le racisme), Cameroonian French artist Bams pronounced the following words in the beginning of her speech that made me want to write this article (my translation):

Here we go, today two shirts are torn and it goes on the first page of newspapers because the White dignity, i.e. the dominant body’s dignity, is attacked. But what about when you’re Black in France, when our soiled bodies are continuously displayed to the world, our cadavers, our war victims, our South presidents who are qualified in France as dictators, are dragged in pajama in front of the planet’s cameras if we have not yet beheaded, drown or hanged. What about the dignity of Black people? (see full transcript here)

She then continued her speech by describing her participation to the political fight against the exhibition Exhibit B by white South-African artist Brett Bailey, which displayed live black bodies (some of which naked) in display cases, supposedly to give an incarnated vision of racism (which he provided but not in the way he intended). Going back to the Air France event, when one pays attention to the words used by politicians and journalists to describe this event, we can see the contrast described by Bams. What the terms “shock,” “stupefaction,” “scandal” reveal in the surprise that they all involve, is the extreme rarity of the humiliating display of “the powerful’s” bodies. These words are sincere: these politicians and journalists are indeed, shocked, stupefied and scandalized, because what they see in these images, perhaps for the first time, is their own body, displayed in the fragile nudity of their sudden deprivation of power. We remember similar reactions in France when in May 2011, the American media had showed with great spectacle the handcuffed body that was supposed to be its next President, Dominique Strauss-Kahn.

But let’s go back to the shirt itself, since clothing politics is a crucial dimension of the relationship between design and the bodies (and will be the topic of the third issue of The Funambulist Magazine). Usually, we wonder what is the social signification for a body to wear a particular piece of cloth. In this case, on the other hand, we can try to question the political implications of the bare body in the public sphere. Currently, the most recurrent display of white bodies displayed in a politically charged setting are the ones of the FEMEN, a group of women whose voluntary nudity aims to challenge a patriarchal society that has however mutated decades ago and now capitalizes on these canonical bodies’ sexualized imagery, rather than is threaten by it. Such a discrepancy of eras would not be so damaging if it was not reinforced by a loud and narrow vision of feminism characterized by the idea that less (clothes) is more (resistance), thus disqualifying the thousands of women wearing “more clothes” (a hijab for instance) in Western cities, where both personal and structural racism antagonizes them for doing so. What the politicans and journalists that can only identify with the stripped white body of the Air France director of human resources do not understand, is that a woman who is stripped of her hijab, either physically — this kind of islamophobic attacks are spreading in Europe — or administratively (in French middle-school or high-school for instance) is subjected to two forms of violence: a physical and social one that, admittedly, the Air France managers also experienced, and that manifests itself through the sudden and forced display of her undressed body, but also a second one, fundamentally unknown to these managers and the other “powerful”: the intimate knowledge that this undressing violence is backed by the normative, institutional, and sometimes legal processes of marginalization of their bodies.

This is where the fence mentioned in the title intervene in the analysis of this story. In fact, the flight of these two stripped bodies ends after they climb the fence to join the police officers on the other side of it. As my friend Hélène Clemente pointed out when we recently discussed about this event, this fence that ultimately separates the angry unionists and the fearful managers cannot not be interpreted within our current imaginary of walls and fences. When dozens of Subsaharian migrants climb the high fences of the Spanish enclaves of Mellila and Ceuta (see past article) the police that await them on the other side are not here to protect them but, on the contrary, to arrest them in view of their future expulsion. The fence itself remains the same: it separates two milieus and spatially organizes bodies on each of its sides. The border it constitutes can be subverted (by going over it) but the consequences of such subversion vary drastically depending on the bodies that accomplish it: while bodies that belong to the social group that established the fence are granted the latter’s protection, others that do not accept its segregative effects will be socially and/or legally punished for having challenged the political agenda that they compromised when they subverted the architectural violence of the fence. The King might be naked but he’ll be fine as long as he’ll have walls to protect him.

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On the Notion of Mistake in the Recent Racist Murders and What It Means for “Palestinianness”

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Today (October 19, 2015), Al Jazeera released an article entitled “Eritrean mistaken for Palestinian shot dead in Israel” recounting one more murder of a man of color in Palestine by Israeli civilians. This title reminded another from last week, when an Sephardic Jew was stabbed by an Israeli man who “had him mistaken for an Arab” (see “Stabbed Israeli Jew mistaken for Arab criticises violence” in The Guardian). Encountering the notion of mistake in the context of a racist murder is rather surprising when we come to think of what it implies. Following this logic, the numerous racist murders against Palestinians from the last three weeks would therefore be non-mistaken crimes, even in the cases where the only thing that precipitated the violent death of a Palestinian man or woman was to be finger-pointed by an Israeli person screaming “(S)he has a knife!”. The mistake would thus be less about the legitimacy for a Palestinian to be killed than about the fact that this person is actually Palestinian or not.

This leads us to the question of Palestinianness. Questioning this notion might appear rather strange at first, and it seems to inappropriately recall the contemporary demagogic questions of European nations about who can be said to be truly Hungarian, or French, or Dutch — questions that already have a clear and definite answer in mind while being asked. We usually think of Palestinians as the Arabs (including the Bedouins) who used to live in Palestine before 1948 and their descendants and learn about this nation in several studies, like Rashid Khalidi‘s Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (Columbia University Press, 2009). Although this historico-ethnic definition has a legitimacy in the anti-colonial struggle since this is a definition applied administratively by the State of Israel (even Palestinians who have the Israeli citizenship are not citizens to the fullest extent), it lacks a certain degree of complexity that could address these supposed “mistakes” in the current racist murders, and that could also use terminology to envision a future for Palestine.

Rather than essentializing bodies according to their origin and  current situations (African Jews, Eritrean immigrants, Bedouins, Palestinians living in Israel, in East-Jerusalem, in the West Bank, in Gaza, refugees in Palestine and outside of it, etc.) we could be tempted of a definition including all bodies whose life is directly or indirectly affected by the State of Israel’s structural racism. We would therefore write that a Eritrean man was not murdered because he was mistaken for a Palestinian but, rather, that he was Palestinian because he was the target of a racist murder — i.e. a murder based on his ethnicity, backed by administrative and political racism that conditioned through various means this crime not to be judged as one.

Nevertheless, this last definition is a problematic one, since it implies that Palestinianness is contingent to the State of Israel, in a similar way that the latter has been demagogically claiming that the very Palestinian nation is born at its own creation in 1948 — something that a book like Palestinian Identity has no problem to prove wrong. There must be a more affirmative definition, resolutely turned towards the future. What if, instead, Palestinians were simply the bodies whose lives are historically intricate to the land of Palestine, as well as those that want to live on it? This definition of Palestinians would thus not be only terminologically political (through the idea a post-Apartheid future including an important population of Jewish Palestinian for example) but also allowing a future open immigration that would not only include the traditional Palestinian diaspora, but also anyone else who would like to live in Palestine.

When we look at the European Union or at Israel, we see the contrast of some borders falling for some specific bodies (anyone from the Jewish diaspora can acquire the Israeli citizenship for instance) and some others either considerably reinforced or created. This contrast is motivated by the racist selection of the specific bodies to which it benefits. Inspired by the exchanges I have been having in the past with Palestinian friends about the future of the country (Nora Akawi: “we can’t solve non-conventional problems with conventional solutions,” Sophia Azeb: “Not a two-state solution, not a one-state solution, just a no-state solution,” and Raja Shehadeh: “A borderless region from Tripoli to the Sinai“), it is my belief that such a broad and unique definition of Palestinianness could emerge through the refusal of such a selection. This emergence could, in fact, be one potential scenario following the abolition of all forms of structural, administrative and policing racism, through the legal and practical construction of a strict equity for all bodies in Palestine.

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The Weaponized Architecture of Paris Northern Banlieue Police Stations

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Tomorow, October 27, 2015, we will commemorate the tenth anniversary of the death of Bouna Traoré and Zyed Benna, two teenagers of Clichy sous Bois (North-Eastern Paris banlieue) who died in an electric transformer after being illegitimately chased by the police. For this reason, I chose this date to publish the second issue of The Funambulist Magazine, dedicated to suburban geographies (with significant contributions about the French banlieues). But, before tomorrow, I wanted to present a photographic report of a small investigation accomplished yesterday about the architecture of four police stations in the Northern banlieues.

For an important amount of the banlieues inhabitants, in particular the Black and Arab youth, the police incarnate a daily reminder of the structural antagonism at work against their neighborhood and their bodies. As explained in a past article entitled “The Banlieue Battleground: Designing the French Suburbs for Police/Military Interventions,” this antagonism reached its peak during the nine years of Nicolas Sarkozy’s executive mandates (four years as Minister of Interior and five as President) between 2003-2004, and 2005- (see the Karsher declaration, only a few days before the death of Bouna and Zyed) 2012, but it never really dissolved since then — the current Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, also formerly Minister of Interior shares a certain amount of similarities with Sarkozy’s politics, despite being part of the Socialist Party. The strategy of the State vis-a-vis the cités (high density public housing in a low density urban fabric) consists in a gradual withdrawal of its service and an increase of police control. The latter’s violence is characterized by disrespectful discourse, systematic identity control, random chase and/or arrests, and sometimes, the use of a potentially lethal arsenal coming from a prolific security market. The following photographs attempt to show that architecture as well constitutes a weapon both symbolic and effective reinforcing the strong antagonism developed by the police against the banlieue youth. The police stations’ architectures, through their spatiality, their aesthetics and the care in the materials used (brick for the Aubervilliers one, and even some marble imitation for the Pierrefitte one, see below) attempt to present them as authored works, designed by architecture offices that also conceive libraries, schools, housing, etc. However, the agenda of this architecture is fairly explicit to anyone who knows their antagonizing context: these police station are built to respond to the potentiality of a “siege” undertaken against them — a rather odd hypothesis when one knows the police arsenal — by what they imagine to be hordes of barbarian youth (paranoia is necessary to maintain the antagonism). The walls of these stations are thus opaque with various degrees of inclination (a well-known technique by 17th-century fortress architects!), the more transparent parts are elevated, out-of-reach, and the sidewalks in front of their entrances are made inaccessible for vehicles through the presence of metallic cones (ubiquitous on the Paris sidewalks). Architecture is weaponized here again, and architects should be held accountable for the responsibility of their contribution to the antagonism developed by the State and its police towards the banlieue inhabitants.

Let us simply nuance this article’s argument by insisting that the presence of a police station in a given neighborhood is not, as such, a necessary form of antagonism. In 1998, Lionel Jospin’s government had implemented a police doctrine based on “proximity” which was later terminated by Sarkozy when he began his functions of Minister of Interior in 2003. Although this ‘experiment’ of another police modus operandi did not disassemble in depth the mechanisms of police brutality and discrimination, many local voices recognized the value of police officers knowing personally the people who are supposed to be under their protection (rather than under their suspicion). In a recent conversation organized by Mediapart and the Bondy Blog (one of the well-known banlieue media) dedicated to the ten years that followed Bouna and Zyed’s deaths, their families’ lawyer, Emmanuel Tordjman, explained that the police that chased the two teenagers came from a neighboring municipality and their ignorance of the neighborhood certainly “contributed to their madness” chasing a group of children. Since then, a (colorful!) police station has opened in Clichy-sous-Bois. Although I am personally convinced that the very function of the police necessarily carries a form of violence, even in its proximity form, we also have to recognize that many of the activists organized against police brutality and criminality would be satisfied (as a first step) by a certain amount of reforms challenging the current impunity from which they benefit.

SITUATION MAP ///

Map Northern BanlieueNorth is on the right side / The length of the map is 20 kilometers / Red squares are the cités (see past map/article) / Blue squares are the photographed police stations

All photographs by Léopold Lambert (October 2015):

01: VILLIERS LE BEL POLICE STATION ///

Police Villiers le Bel - Photo by Léopold Lambert (2018)

Police Villiers le Bel - Photo by Léopold Lambert (2019)

Police Villiers le Bel - Photo by Léopold Lambert (2020)

Police Villiers le Bel - Photo by Léopold Lambert (2017)

Police Villiers le Bel - Photo by Léopold Lambert (2016)

02: GARGES LES GONESSES POLICE STATION ///

Police Garges les Gonesse - Photo by Léopold Lambert (2015)

Police Garges les Gonesse - Photo by Léopold Lambert (2017)

Police Garges les Gonesse - Photo by Léopold Lambert (2016) It does not get any better than this entrance in terms of expressive symbols!

03: PIERREFITTE POLICE STATION ///

Police Pierrefitte - Photo by Léopold Lambert (2017)

Police Pierrefitte - Photo by Léopold Lambert (2015)

Police Pierrefitte - Photo by Léopold Lambert (2016)

04: AUBERVILLIERS POLICE STATION ///

Police Aubervilliers (1)

Police Aubervilliers (2)

Police Aubervilliers (3)

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The Funambulist Magazine 02: Suburban Geographies Now Out

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The Funambulist Magazine 02: Suburban Geographies (November 2015)

Today is October 27, 2015. Exactly ten years ago, ten teenagers from Clichy-sous-Bois (North-Eastern Paris banlieue) who were coming back from a football game were illegitimately chased by the police. They did not have their ID cards with them (who has it to play football?) and, for some of them, did not want to be late for the break of the Ramadan fast, so they ran. Three of them, Muhittin Altun, Zyed Benna, and Bouna Traoré, found shelter in an electric transformer, but were electrocuted and burnt to death; only Muhittin survived. This tragic event, illustrative of the police’s discriminate controls in the banlieues — the banlieue youth, in particular the Black and Arab one, is sometimes controlled by the police more than once a day — as well as of the politicians’ absolute disconnection (if not, clear antagonism) from these neighborhoods. A few days earlier, Nicolas Sarkozy, back then Minister of Interior, had promised to wash-out the banlieues “with a Karsher.” Following the outrage and anger of Zyed and Bouna’s death, the French Banlieue revolted for three weeks against police violence and the deep social segregation their living space embodies. The most spectacular forms of this revolt, characterized by numerous cars, and a few buildings burnt (more about this in a forthcoming article) were relayed by the press of the world, and the journalists went back to the banlieues “like they were visiting a zoo” as the character of Hubert Kounde points out in Mathieu Kassovitz’s canonical film La Haine, which depicts all-too-similar events ten years before 2005. Ten years after the great revolt, and twenty after La Haine, nothing has changed for the French banlieues and the antagonism developed by the police is still very much operative as architecture itself illustrates (see yesterday’s article about Paris Northern banlieue police stations). The struggle for social, legal, racial and territorial equality requires efforts on all fields, including the one of critical intellectual research. It was thus important for me to publish the second issue of The Funambulist Magazine dedicated to Suburban Geographies on this symbolical date, as the following editorial note, accompanied by the evocative images of La Haine asserts:

The Funambulist Magazine 2 - Edito

Although this second issue has a significant part of its content dedicated to the French banlieues (photographs by Adel Tincelin and article by Hacène Belmessous about police urban planning in particular), it examines many more peripheral forms of urbanity that are all characterized by voluntary or forced segregated territoriality. In the case of Brasilia, anthropologist Antonádia Borges uses the two opposite figures of the miss and the misfit to describe how the canonical architectural city only hosts the highest social class of the city, while the working class live in poorly connected satellite cities. On the contrary, Tina Grandinetti gives us a critical reading of the voluntary withdrawal of the city center of Ramallah by the Palestinian middle class to favor newly built neighborhoods/towns, like Rawabi to live apart from the rest of society, in a normalization process of the Israeli occupation. In Johannesburg, Angelo Fick uses the example of the suburban neighborhood of Killarney to describe the urban reminiscences of the South African apartheid that still operate as a segregative device. The American suburbia is also a predominant paradigm throughout this issue, in particular through Olivia Ahn‘s article about the suburban house as a  post-war gender productive apparatus, and the Archipelago interview with Karen Tongson about Los Angeles’ queer suburban imaginaries. As usual, student works are also put forward in relation to the topic with projects in Madrid (Alejandro Cantera López), Paris (Henri Bony) and Long Island (Olivia Ahn). I hope that this issue will contribute to a productive debate in the severe role played by urbanism, architecture, design in the segregative organization of territory, as well as the potentiality to subvert — Olivia Ahn would say “to queer” — these mechanisms in order to dissolve the gender, racial and social violence this segregation produces.

In addition to the contributors cited above, I would like to thank the photographs (Cyrus Cornut, Andrea & Magda, Gabo Morales, and Deanna Erdmann) who agreed to see their work reinforcing the arguments made in the texts, Amrit Trewn for transcribing and editing the Archipelago interviews, Liduam Pong, Fanny Léglise, Joanne Pouzenc for their translations, as well as Hiroko Nakatani, Philippe Theophanidis, Maxwell Donnewald, Felicia Yong, and Zulaikha Ayub for their much appreciated support.

You can purchase the issue in its printed version and in its digital one. A combo printed + digital also exists, as well as a November offer to purchase both the first and second issues together for a discounted price. The Funambulist (to the exception of its podcast) is only founded by these sales that thus represent a significant form of support of the project as a whole (magazine, blog, and podcast), and you can subscribe to it on a monthly basis to show such a support. If you are in London on November 2, feel free to join us at the Westminster Law & Theory Lab for a formal presentation of the magazine in general, and this issue in particular. Thank you very much for your attention and interest for this work.

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